The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was the political alliance that ended the Kenya African National Union's (KANU) nearly four-decade monopoly on power, sweeping Mwai Kibaki to the presidency in December 2002 with 62 percent of the vote. NARC's formation, its landslide victory, and its rapid fragmentation encapsulate the possibilities and limitations of coalition politics in Kenya - a recurring pattern in which broad-based movements united by opposition to an incumbent regime fracture once the spoils of power must be divided.
NARC emerged from the convergence of two political streams during 2002. The first was the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), formed by senior KANU politicians - most prominently Raila Odinga (later of ODM) - who defected after President Daniel arap Moi anointed Uhuru Kenyatta as his preferred successor, bypassing long-serving loyalists. The second was the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK), an opposition coalition anchored by Kibaki's Democratic Party, multiparty veterans like Michael Kijana Wamalwa, and civil society leaders who had fought for democratic reform since the Saba Saba era. These two streams merged at a dramatic ceremony in October 2002, producing NARC and agreeing on Kibaki as the joint presidential candidate.
The coalition was cemented by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that promised an equitable sharing of power between the NAK and LDP wings. The MOU envisaged the creation of a prime ministerial position for Raila Odinga, a 50-50 division of cabinet posts, and a comprehensive constitutional review within the first year of government. This agreement proved fateful: its subsequent non-implementation became the central grievance that tore NARC apart.
NARC's electoral campaign captured a genuine mood of national renewal. The slogan "Unbwogable" - borrowed from a popular benga-influenced song by Gidi Gidi Maji Maji - became the anthem of a movement that transcended ethnic calculations. Kenyans across communities voted against KANU's legacy of corruption, economic decline, and authoritarian governance. The December 2002 election delivered not just a presidential landslide but also an overwhelming parliamentary majority, giving NARC a mandate for transformative change.
The early months of the NARC government delivered tangible reforms. Free primary education, introduced in January 2003, sent over a million additional children to school. An anti-corruption authority was established and the flamboyant John Githongo appointed as permanent secretary for governance and ethics. Economic growth began to recover after the stagnation of Moi's final years, and Kenya's international standing improved markedly.
Yet the coalition's internal contradictions surfaced almost immediately. Kibaki, hospitalised after a road accident shortly before his inauguration, was surrounded by a tight circle of Mount Kenya advisors who marginalised the LDP wing and ignored the MOU. Raila Odinga and his allies received fewer and less influential cabinet positions than promised. The constitutional review process - which was supposed to create the power-sharing framework outlined in the MOU - became a battleground between those favouring a strong presidency (largely aligned with Kibaki) and those advocating for a parliamentary system with an executive prime minister.
The rupture became irreversible during the 2005 constitutional referendum. The government-backed "Wako Draft" diluted the devolution proposals from the Bomas conference, prompting Raila and the LDP faction to campaign for a "No" vote under the orange symbol. The draft's decisive defeat humiliated Kibaki, who responded by dismissing his entire cabinet - effectively expelling the LDP ministers and ending the NARC experiment. The former allies reorganised into competing formations: Kibaki's faction evolved into the Party of National Unity, while Raila's group became the Orange Democratic Movement, setting the stage for the bitterly contested 2007 election and the catastrophic violence that followed.
NARC's trajectory offers enduring lessons about Kenyan politics. It demonstrated that Kenyans could vote across ethnic lines when offered a credible alternative, yet it also showed how quickly elite bargains could collapse when institutional frameworks for power-sharing were absent - a lesson that informed the devolution provisions ultimately enshrined in the 2010 Constitution.
See Also
- Mwai Kibaki
- KANU
- ODM
- Multiparty Politics
- 2007-2008 Post Election Violence
- Constitutional Reform 2010
- Moi Era Corruption
Sources
- Murunga, Godwin R. and Shadrack W. Nasong'o, eds. Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy. London: Zed Books, 2007.
- Steeves, Jeffrey. "The Political Evolution of Kenya: The 2002 Transition and Its Aftermath." Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 44, no. 1 (2006): 64-84.
- Anderson, David M. "Vigilantes, Violence and the Politics of Public Order in Kenya." African Affairs 101, no. 405 (2002): 531-555.
- Branch, Daniel. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.